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INTERSPOUSAL TORT IMMUNITY IN 
MONTANA 
Carl Tobias* 
Interspousal tort immunity has a lengthy, rich, and interesting 
history. 1 But since 1970, courts and legislatures have been increas-
ingly willing to abolish immunity, transforming it into a minority 
rule which appears destined for widespread elimination by the year 
2000. Montana's recent experience is typical. In 1979, the Legisla-
ture abolished the rule for intentional torts. However, the Montana 
Supreme Court has retained the doctrine in the negligence context. 
The court has recently agreed to reconsider negligence immunity 
and, should it refuse to change the rule, the Legislature may well 
address the issue. Thus, it is now appropriate to analyze whether 
Montana should eliminate interspousal tort immunity in negli-
gence actions. 
This essay first surveys immunity's history. Because the ques-
tion of tort immunity has essentially become a debate over the 
public policy reasons for the doctrine's abolition or continued ap-
plication, the paper then examines those rationales. This assess-
ment yields the conclusions that the arguments for elimination are 
more persuasive than those favoring retention and that continued 
application of the rule serves virtually no useful purpose. There-
fore, abolition of negligence immunity is warranted. Finally, the es-
say explores significant implications of abolition. 
I. THE HISTORY OF INTERSPOUSAL TORT IMMUNITY 
A. United States 
The ongms and early development of the concept of inter-
spousal tort immunity warrant only cursory examination.2 At com-
mon law, upon marriage, a woman's legal status was considered 
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the Cowley Endowment. This essay is in memory of Ruthann Crippen Brier. 
1. The classic treatment was McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 
43 HARV. L. REV. 1030 (1930). Cf. Comment, Toward Abolition of Interspousal Tort Immu-
nity, 36 MONT. L. REV. 251 (1975) (earlier Montana work); Annot., 92 A.L.R.3D 901 (1979) 
(compilation of cases). 
2. For helpful treatment, see McCurdy, supra note 1. See generally W. PROSSER AND 
P. KEETON, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 122 (5th ed. 1984). 
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merged into her husband's.3 Merged legal identity had telling im-
plications for possible tort claims between wedded individuals: 
neither could acquire a substantive cause of action for personal in-
juries inflicted by the other, but even if one could there would have 
been the procedural complications of the husband being both de-
fendant and plaintiff as well as being entitled to any damages 
awarded." Thus, at early common law, the combination of the indi-
cia of marriage, "some substantive, some procedural, some concep-
tual," prevented each spouse from ever being "civilly liable as a 
tortfeasor . . . to the other for any act, antenuptial or during mar-
riage, causing personal injury which would have been a tort but for 
the marriage. "5 
Wives in colonial America at the time of early settlement en-
joyed somewhat greater freedom than their English counterparts.6 
By the end of the seventeenth and throughout the eighteenth cen-
tury, however, wedded females in the colonies and the mother 
country had comparable legal status, as English concepts of mari-
tal property and the wife's subservience became prevalent. 7 More-
over, the American Revolution only minimally altered wedded 
women's circumstances,8 and as late as the mid-nineteenth century 
wives' legal status was marginally better than that of a much ear-
lier time. 9 But, beginning about 1840, the coalescence of numerous 
considerations prompted passage of married women's property 
3. The classic articulation appears in William Blackstone's eighteenth century Com-
mentaries on the Law of England: "By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in 
law; that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the mar-
riage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of her husband, under whose 
wing, protection, and cover, she performs everything." 
4. As to substance, see Austin v. Austin, 136 Miss. 61, 69, 100 So. 591, 592 (1924); 
Schultz v. Christopher, 65 Wash. 496, 118 P. 629 (1911). As to procedure, see Abbott v. 
Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 308 (1877); McCurdy, supra note 1, at 1033-35. For complete listings of 
the disabilities imposed by merger, see id. at 1031-35; w. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW 
OF TORTS § 122, at 859-60 (4th ed. 1971) (and cases cited therein). 
5. McCurdy, Personal Injury Torts Between Spouses, 4 VILL. L. REV. 303, 307 (1959). 
Accord 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 8.10, at 643 (1956). Cf. Haglund, Tort 
Actions Between Husband and Wife, 27 GEO. L.J. 697, 704 (1939) (interspousal tort actions 
unknown at common law); Phillips v. Barnett, 1 Q.B.D. 436 (1876) (English development). 
6. See R. MORRIS, STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (1930); Chused, Married 
Women's Property Law: 1800-1850, 71 GEO. L.J. 1359, 1384-91 (1983). 
7. See id. at 1389-91; Salmon, The Legal Status of Women in Early America: A Reap-
praisal, 1 LAW & HisT. REV. 129 (1983). 
8. See L. KERBER, WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC: INTELLECT AND IDEOLOGY IN REVOLUTION-
ARY AMERICA (1980); M. NORTON, LIBERTY'S DAUGHTERS: THE REVOLUTIONARY EXPERIENCE OF 
AMERICAN WOMEN, 1750-1800 (1980). 
9. See J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (1826); E. MANSFIELD, THE LEGAL 
RIGHTS, LIABILITIES AND DUTIES OF WOMEN (1845); T. REEVE, THE LAW OF BARON AND FEMME 
(1846 ed.); Walker, The Legal Condition of Women, in THE GOLDEN AGE OF AMERICAN LAW 
316-18 (C. Haar ed. 1965). 
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acts. 10 By the 1870's, nearly every state had enacted such statutes 
which generally expanded females' rights to hold property.11 This 
had important consequences for interspousal tort immunity. 
Most significantly, the legislation afforded a handle for abol-
ishing immunity and permitting personal injury actions between 
husbands and wives. Measures empowering wedded females to sue 
anyone for damages on their own behalf made it possible to argue 
that (1) merger had been eliminated, (2) incapacities had been 
lifted or (3) incidents of legal personality had been prescribed and, 
thus, that interspousal tort litigation should be allowed. These con-
tentions were precisely the ones asserted by lawyers who pursued 
the initial cases in the 1860's. The statutes were integral to resolu-
tion of most interspousal tort suits during the ensuing 80 years. 
Each state legislature enacted married women's property acts 
granting females indicia of legal status in numerous waves at dif-
ferent times continuing into the twentieth century.12 The measures 
were passed for many reasons and at the instigation of changing 
coalitions. The statutory terminology was dissimilar, but none ex-
plicitly prescribed tort litigation between wedded people. More-
over, little legislative history attended passage of the acts. None-
theless, over time, every jurisdiction modified particular indicia of 
wives' legal personhood, slowly eroded merger, and gradually be-
stowed legal identity. Thus, while enactment of the measures can-
not be characterized as a radical reform, by the end of the amend-
ment process, it effected changes in interspousal legal relations. 
These alterations had telling implications for tort immunity. In 
short, the married women's statutes afforded an "entering wedge" 
for attorneys who litigated the first cases, initiating a process 
which is ongoing. 
The immunity opinions can be categorized into four distinct 
time frames. From 1863 until 1913, no state allowed tort claims.13 
10. The exact date is 1835. See Chused, supra note 6, at 1398-99. 
11. For helpful analyses of the statutes, see Chused, supra note 6; Johnston, Sex and 
Property: The Common Law Tradition, The Law School Curriculum and Developments 
Toward Equality, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1033 (1971). Cf. Chused, Late Nineteenth Century 
Married Women's Property Law: Reception of the Early Married Women's Property Acts 
by Courts and Legislatures, 29 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 1 (1985) (implementation of Oregon 
legislation). 
12. In the following discussion of the acts, I rely substantially on Chused, supra note 
6. 
13. See Peters v. Peters, 156 Cal. 32, 103 P. 219 (1909); Deeds v. Strode, 6 Idaho 317, 
55 P. 656 (1898); Main v. Main, 46 Ill. App. 106 (1891); Henneger v. Lomas, 145 Ind. 287, 44 
N.E. 462 (1896); Peters v. Peters, 42 Iowa 182 (1876); Abbott, 67 Me. 304; Bandfield v. 
Bandfield, 117 Mich. 80, 75 N.W. 287 (1898); Strom v. Strom, 98 Minn. 427, 107 N.W. 1047 
(1906); Longendyke v. Longendyke, 44 Barb. 366 (N.Y 1863), Freethy v. Freethy, 42 Barb. 
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In 1910, a one-Justice majority of the United States Supreme 
Court rejected personal injury suit in the District of Columbia.14 
Between 1914 and 1920, seven jurisdictions recognized tort actions, 
while a similar number upheld immunity.u The doctrine eroded 
slowly over the succeeding half century and has been dramatically 
converted to a minority proposition since 1970. 
Prior to 1950, judges recognizing or abolishing interspousal 
tort immunity relied substantially on their statutory interpreta-
tions of the married women's acts, although those measures are 
mentioned infrequently and are never dispositive today. 16 Notwith-
standing early dependence on the legislation, courts articulated nu-
merous public policy arguments for immunity's retention or 
abolition. 
Five contentions favoring continued application have been 
enunciated most often. The notion that immunity's recognition 
preserves conjugal harmony and that interspousal tort claims 
would disturb peace was formulated first, has been articulated 
most frequently, and remains a convincing argument. A second sig-
nificant explanation for whatever strength the rule retains is the 
concern that wedded individuals permitted to sue one another 
would perpetrate fraud on insurance carriers. The idea that judges 
should defer to legislators is the only additional argument which 
has vitality. Arguments that the doctrine's elimination would 
"open the floodgates" of litigation and that injured husbands and 
wives must seek "alternative relief' in criminal or divorce courts, 
which were enunciated in older opinions, are never seriously relied 
upon today. 17 Few affirmative policy contentions for rejecting im-
641 (N.Y. 1865); Nickerson v. Nickerson, 65 Tex. 281 (1886); Schultz, 65 Wash. 496, 118 P. 
629. Cf. McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903) (dictum in case recogniz-
ing parent-child tort immunity). 
14. See Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910). 
15. The states recognizing interspousal tort litigation were Johnson v. Johnson, 201 
Ala. 41, 77 So. 335 (1917); Fitzpatrick v. Owens, 124 Ark. 167, 186 S.W. 832 (1916); Brown v. 
Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 A. 889 (1914); Gilman v. Gilman, 78 N.H. 4, 95 A. 657 (1915); Crow-
ell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 105 S.E. 206 (1920); Fiedeer v. Fiedeer, 42 Okla. 124, 140 P. 
1022 (1914); Prosser v. Prosser, 114 S.C. 45, 102 S.E. 787 (1920). States refusing to do so 
were Heyman v. Heyman, 19 Ga. 634, 92 S.E. 25 (1917); Dishon's Admr. v. Dishon's Admr., 
187 Ky. 497, 219 S.W. 794 (1920); Drake v. Drake, 145 Minn. 388, 177 N.W. 624 (1920); 
Rogers v. Rogers, 265 Mo. 200, 177 S.W. 382 (1915); Lillienkamp v. Rippetoe, 133 Tenn. 57, 
179 S.W. 628 (1915); Keister's Adm'r v. Keister's Ex'rs, 123 Va. 157, 96 S.E. 315 (1918). 
16. The court which decided the first Montana case relied substantially on statutory 
interpretation. See Conley v. Conley, 92 Mont. 425, 15 P.2d 922 (1932). See generally infra 
notes 25-27 and accompanying text. The acts are never dispositive today, because courts 
treat immunity as a public policy question. 
17. See Merenoff v. Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535, 548-57, 388 A.2d 951, 958-62 (1978); 
Shearer v. Shearer, 18 Ohio St. 3d 94, 480 N.E.2d 388, 392-95 (1985); Hack v. Hack, 495 Pa. 
300, 311-16, 433 A.2d 859, 864-67 (1981). Other antiquated arguments, such as "juridical 
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munity have been espoused, principally because many judges who 
repudiated the doctrine relied upon the married women's statutes 
or rejected the policy concepts articulated for retaining inter-
spousal tort immunity.18 Nonetheless, two arguments have been 
enunciated: abolition would allow the goals of tort law, primarily 
deterrence, punishment, and compensation, to be realized and the 
individual rights of females to be vindicated.19 
B. Montana 
Although it is very difficult to generalize, a Montana wife, by 
virtue of her "frontier" status, apparently enjoyed somewhat more 
favorable legal treatment than her sisters in either the East or the 
Far West. For example, the first Montana Territorial Legislature 
adopted an early married women's act modeled on the California 
statute,20 and in 1889, the first female gained admission to the 
bar. 21 But subsequent married women's measures only slowly ex-
panded females' rights and were similar to those adopted in other 
states.22 Thus, on balance, Montana wives' legal status probably 
differed in degree, not kind, from that of wedded females in most 
jurisdictions when the Montana Supreme Court was first asked to 
recognize interspousal tort litigation. 23 
Case law development of interspousal tort immunity has been 
relatively recent and constricted. The initial suit was filed in 1932. 
Since then there have been only three and the reasoning employed 
in the opinions is narrowly confined. 2 ' The first, Conley v. Con-
equality," appear in early cases. See, e.g., Conley, 92 Mont. at 439, 15 P.2d at 926. Cf. Olsen, 
The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1497, 
1505, 1511-13 (1983) (discussion of juridical equality concept). See generally infra section 
ll(A) of this article. 
18. See, e.g., Gilman, 78 N.H. 4, 95 A. 657; Prosser, 114 S.C. 45, 102 S.E. 787. 
19. See generally infra section Il(B) of this article. 
20. See Mont. Laws 369 (1864). The modern act appears principally in MONT. CODE 
ANN. tit. 40, ch. 2 (1985). 
21. See 9 Mont. vi (1890) and compare with Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 
(1873) and In Re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116 (1894). Cf. MoNT. CONST. art. IX, § 10 (1889) 
(women eligible to hold any school district office and vote in school district elections). 
22. These are traced in Conley, 92 Mont. at 432-34, 15 P.2d at 923-24. 
23. Much more research must be undertaken before definitive conclusions can be 
drawn. Cf. Telephone interview with Paula Petrik, Professor of History, Montana State 
University (certain aspects of Montana law regarding wives' legal status and divorce more 
progressive, and others, less progressive, than nationally). See generally G. BAKKEN, THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF LAW ON THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN FRONTIER: CIVIL LAW AND SOCIETY, 1850-
1912 (1983); Chused, supra notes 6, 11. It is interesting that, but unclear precisely why, no 
case was filed until 1932 by which time the married women's legislation had been substan-
tially amended. 
24. All four cases have involved wives injured by husbands' negligent driving. There 
also are the closely related cases discussed infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text and 
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ley,26 was premised principally on merged legal identity, the com-
mon law rule against interspousal tort claims which could only be 
modified by the married women's act, and the finding that Mon-
tana's measure was not intended to alter the doctrine. But the 
court also tangentially based the decision on connubial harmony 
and judicial deference. 26 Opinions rendered in 1933 and 1968 
merely cited the precedential ruling in Conley and relied on legis-
lative inaction respecting the immunity issue.27 However, even as 
recently as 1975 the Montana Supreme Court found that the mar-
ried women's statute did not prescribe interspousal tort actions 
and declared that immunity was a "question of public policy best 
left to the legislative branch of government which is the proper 
body to determine and set forth public policy."28 
Nevertheless, subsequent developments in areas that pertain 
to negligence immunity may be more telling. In two 1983 cases, the 
court "rejected the defense of interspousal tort immunity for prop-
erty damage claims," relying partly on the Second Restatement of 
Torts which had "repudiated the defense,"29 and refused to recog-
nize the closely analogous intrafamily tort immunity governing 
parents and children. 30 During 1979, the Montana Legislature 
eliminated interspousal immunity for intentional torts in the con-
text of passing legislation aimed primarily at the problem of 
spouse abuse.31 However, immunity from suit in negligence re-
legislative abrogation of intentional tort immunity discussed infra note 31 and accompany-
ing text. See generally Dutton v. Hightower & Lubrecht Constr. Co., 214 F. Supp. 298 (D. 
Mont. 1963). 
25. 92 Mont. 425, 15 P.2d 922. 
26. See id. at 926. The Montana court also mentioned juridical equality, while re-
jecting constitutional arguments. See id. See generally supra note 17; infra notes 65, 75. 
27. See Kelly v. Williams, 94 Mont. 19, 21 P.2d 58 (1933); State ex rel. Angvall v. 
District Court, 151 Mont. 483, 484-86, 444 P.2d 370, 370-71 (1968). Indeed, both opinions 
consider legislative inaction important to, if not dispositive of, the immunity issue. 
28. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Leary, 168 Mont. 482, 485-87, 544 P.2d 444, 
446-47 (1975). 
29. Norick v. Dove Constr. __ Mont. __ , 662 P.2d 1318, 1320-21 (1983). 
30. See Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Royle, __ Mont. __ , 656 P.2d 820 (1983). 
31. See MONT. CooE ANN. § 40-2-109 (1985). The legislation was entitled "an act gen-
erally revising the law relating to assaults and intentional torts between spouses" and pro-
vided for injunctions to prevent disruption of the home by family members. See S.B. 409 
(1979). Negligence immunity is not mentioned in the "legislative history" of S.B. 409 com-
piled by the Office of the Montana Legislative Council at the Montana Law Review's re-
quest (on file with the Montana Law Review). Carol Mitchell, a member of the State Task 
Force on Spouse Abuse, who testified in favor of the legislation and Senator Fred Van 
Valkenburg, who was a member of the Judiciary Committee which considered it, did not 
remember the issue of negligence immunity being raised. Telephone interviews with Carol 
Mitchell, Fred Van Valkenburg (Dec. 5, 1985). Senator Thomas Towe, who also was a mem-
ber of the Judiciary Committee, agreed but indicated that the Legislature would never have 
voted to abolish negligence immunity had the issue been raised. See telephone interview 
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mains intact, although the Montana Supreme Court has decided to 
re-examine that issue in 1986. 
II. PUBLIC POLICY REASONS 
A. Reasons for Retention of Immunity 
There are five traditionally espoused public policy rationales 
for interspousal tort immunity's recognition and retention. Modern 
judges rarely rely on the propositions that abolition would open 
the floodgates or that wedded people must pursue alternative rem-
edies afforded by divorce or criminal law.32 The Montana Supreme 
Court has never depended on the two ideas in the interspousal tort 
immunity context. A third argument, that abrogation would dis-
rupt family harmony, has limited applicability to negligently in-
flicted injury, primarily because insurance invariably covers such 
harm. Thus, insurance minimizes the possibility of discord, as the 
Montana Supreme Court recognized in its parent-child immunity 
determination. 33 But, as the court also acknowledged, this leads to 
one of the remaining viable policy contentions favoring retention 
of interspousal tort immunity-fear that spouses would engage in 
fraud and collusion. The other is that legislatures should resolve 
the immunity issue. 
1. Fraud and Collusion 
The Montana Supreme Court, unlike courts in other jurisdic-
tions, has never VQiced concern that dishonest husbands and wives 
would defraud their carriers. The Montana court did find, how-
ever, that the "possibility of fraud and collusion [was] probably 
the most persuasive argument against abrogation of parent-child 
immunity," observing that "unscrupulous families may attempt to 
recover unjustified awards from insurance companies."34 Judges 
have offered numerous explanations why there is great potential 
for fraudulent conduct between wedded persons. Most impor-
tantly, insurance means that spouses may profit from their negli-
gence. Thus, both litigants will benefit from a plaintiff's verdict 
but be disadvantaged by a defendant's judgment, and there may 
with Thomas Towe (Dec. 5, 1985). 
32. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
33. "The existence of liability insurance prevents family discord and depletion of fam-
ily assets in automobile negligence cases." Royle,_ Mont. at_, 656 P.2d at 823. In-
deed, immunity "could actually disrupt marital harmony by imposing substantial financial 
burdens for which compensation cannot be recovered." Infra text accompanying note 56. 
See generally infra note 55 and accompanying text. 
34. Royle, _ Mont. at _, 656 P.2d at 823-24. 
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be irresistible incentives, for example, to overstate the seriousness 
of the actor's negligence or of the harm perpetrated.35 Moreover, 
fraudulent interspousal behavior has substantial likelihood of suc-
cess. 36 Furthermore, litigation of potentially collusive claims can be 
quite expensive for carriers and for the tort law system.37 
The Montana Supreme Court and many others, 'while ac-
knowledging the possibility of unscrupulous conduct, have offered 
numerous responses to these concerns. Most significant is the un-
fairness inherent in systematically excluding an entire class of tor-
tiously harmed people, many of whom have legitimate complaints, 
because certain of its members may behave dishonestly.38 Judges 
prefer to depend upon the protections of the tort law process to 
distinguish collusive actions from valid suits. These safeguards in-
clude numerous pretrial discovery mechanisms and many tech-
niques and participants in trials. For example, there is cross-exam-
ination, while trial judges and jurors have been quite capable of 
detecting inappropriate conduct.39 Should these time-honored 
mechanisms prove insufficient, more stringent devices, such as ele-
vated burdens of proof, could be applied;'0 A few courts have said 
that carriers can be protected by refusing to cover husbands and 
wives.41 But some judges in interspousal tort cases, and the Mon-
35. See Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal.2d 692, 697, 376 P.2d 70, 75, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 107, 
(1962) (Schauer, J., dissenting); Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 372, 173 N.W.2d 416, 
419 (1969); Smith v. Smith, 205 Or. 286, 311, 287 P.2d 572, 583 (1955). 
36. See Leach v. Leach, 227 Ark. 599, 604, 300 S.W.2d 15, 18 (1957) (Harris, C.J., 
dissenting); Raisen v. Raisen, 379 So. 2d 352, 355 (Fla. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 886 
(1980); Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 14 Utah 2d 344, 348, 384 P.2d 389, 391 (1963); Ashdown, 
Intrafamily Immunity, Pure Compensation, and the Family Exclusion Clause, 60 lowA L. 
REV. 239, 250, 252 (1974). 
37. For the tort law system, there may be costs in terms of credibility and public trust. 
See Fernandez v. Romo, 132 Ariz. 447, 451, 646 P.2d 878, 882 (1982); Leach, 227 Ark. at 604, 
300 S.W.2d at 19 (Harris, C.J., dissenting). 
38. See Royle, __ Mont. at __ , 656 P.2d at 824. Accord Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 
242, 267-68, 462 A.2d 506, 518 (1983); Digby v. Digby, 120 R.I. 299, 304, 388 A.2d 1, 4 (1978); 
Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 189, 500 P.2d 771, 775 (1972). 
39. See Brooks v. Robinson, 259 Ind. 16, 21-22, 284 N.E.2d 794, 797 (1972); Shook v. 
Crabb, 281 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Iowa 1979); Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 401, 528 P.2d 1013, 
1015 (1974). 
40. See Beaudette, 285 Minn. at 372, 173 N.W.2d at 420; Merenoff, 76 N.J. at 554-55, 
388 A.2d at 961. Legislative repeal of Montana's guest statute also may reflect policy judg-
ments regarding numerous issues relevant to the fraud and collusion question. For example, 
it may indicate legislators' belief that (1) an entire class should not be systematically re-
quired to meet an elevated burden of proof, (2) the opportunity to pursue compensation 
outweighs the dangers of fraud, or (3) collusion could be detected with available 
mechanisms. 
41. See, e.g., Shook, 281 N.W.2d at 620; Bonkowsky v. Bonkowsky, 69 Ohio St. 2d 152, 
158-59, 431 N.E.2d 998, 1002 n.5 (1982) (W. Brown, J., dissenting); Hack, 495 Pa. at 315, 
433 A.2d at 866. 
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tana court in the parent-children context, have correctly concluded 
that exclusionary clauses would defeat abolition's purpose and, 
thus, invalidated them.42 
2. Judicial Deference 
The policy issue which has most concerned the Montana Su-
preme Court, and judges in numerous other states, is that courts 
should defer to legislatures on questions of public policy.43 A num-
ber of courts have based deference on the notion of legal cer-
tainty"" or the relative capabilities of judges and legislators to treat 
the issues immunity raises.411 Other courts rely upon the compara-
tive authority of the respective governmental branches.46 While the 
Montana immunity cases are cryptic, this last factor appears most 
42. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. DeFrain, 81 Mich. App. 503, 265 N.W.2d 392 (1978); 
Royle, __ Mont. at __ , 656 P.2d at 824. Accord as to parent-child immunity, Stevens v. 
State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 21 Ariz. App. 392, 519 P.2d 1157 (1974). Cf. MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 65B.23 (1974 Supp.); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 623.32(b) (1980) (statutory proscriptions on 
family exclusion clauses). Accord as to no-fault, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-4 (1972); OR. REV. 
STAT. § 743.800 (1974). 
43. For excellent treatment of most of the issues considered in this section, see R. 
KEETON, VENTURING TO Do JUSTICE (1969). An important way that the deference idea was 
cast before 1950 was as a response to the question whether the married women's acts pro-
vided for interspousal tort litigation. Thus, opinions decided then nearly always proclaimed 
that far-reaching changes in the common law, like immunity's abolition, must be effected by 
legislatures in clear terms not by courts in giving unwarranted statutory construction to the 
acts. See, e.g., Conley, 92 Mont. at 440, 15 P.2d at 926; Oken v. Oken, 44 R.I. 291, 293, 117 
A. 357, 358 (1922); McKinney v. McKinney, 59 Wyo. 204, 219, 135 P.2d 940, 944-45, 950 
(1943). See generally supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text. 
44. See, e.g., Robeson v. International Indem. Co., 248 Ga. 306, 309, 282 S.E.2d 896, 
899 (1981); Guffy v. Guffy, 230 Kan. 89, 96-97, 631 P.2d 646, 651 (1981); Rubalcava, 14 Utah 
2d at 352, 384 P.2d at 393. One response to this is that tort immunity's abolition creates no 
more uncertainty than alteration of many other tort doctrines that arose at common law. 
Examples are the remammg immunities-parent-child, governmental, charita-
ble-contributory negligence, and assumption of risk, all of which have been modified by 
courts in numerous jurisdictions. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 2, at §§ 122, 131, 
and 65-68. 
45. Legislatures are said to be more competent to investigate and study abolition, see 
Robeson, 248 Ga. at 309-10, 282 S.E.2d at 899; Boblitz, 296 Md. at 282-83, 462 A.2d at 524-
25 (Couch, J., dissenting); free of the limitations litigants before the court impose, see Alfree 
v. Alfree, 410 A.2d 161, 163 (Del. 1979), appeal dismissed, 446 U.S. 931 (1980); and better 
able to fully treat abrogation, see Klein, 58 Cal. 2d at 696-97, 376 P.2d at 74-75, 26 Cal. 
Rptr. at 106-07 (Schauer, J., dissenting); Brawner v. Brawner, 327 S.W.2d 808, 813 (Mo. 
1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 964 (1960). 
46. See, e.g., Klein, 58 Cal. 2d at 696-97, 376 P.2d at 74, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 106 (Schauer, 
J., dissenting); Stoker v. Stoker, 616 P.2d 590, 594 (Utah 1980) (Crockett, C.J., dissenting). 
Courts also have considered abrogation so radical, or so affected with a public interest in 
wedlock, that it should be left to legislators. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 43; Peters v. 
Peters, 63 Hawaii 653, 659, 634 P.2d 586, 590 (1981); Guffy, 230 Kan. at 96, 631 P.2d at 650-
51. But abolition is no more radical or more affected with a public interest in marriage than 
other legal changes. See generally supra note 44, infra note 61. 
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significant for the court. It cogently remarked just ten years ago: 
"We do not believe [interspousal tort immunity] is an area requir-
ing judicial modification of the common law to prevent great injus-
tice. This is a question of public policy best left to the legislative 
branch of government which is the proper body to determine and 
set forth public policy."47 
However, courts in an overwhelming number of states have 
not deferred in the interspousal immunity context.48 Similarly, the 
Montana court has not deferred when changing many longstanding 
doctrines of tort jurisprudence. Most important to the issue of rel-
ative authority possessed by the governmental branches are many 
judges' determinations that immunity was not statutory, but (1) 
was judicially created and maintained, or (2) arose at common law 
and, thus, was peculiarly appropriate for alteration by courts on 
the basis of public policy. 49 The Montana court has freely modified 
numerous other tort law doctrines which originated at common 
law, especially where justice warranted alteration. For example, the 
justices recognized strict products liability even while acknowledg-
ing that it was a "major change in Montana's tort law by way of 
judicial decision," because "one of the great virtues of the common 
law is its dynamic nature that makes it adaptable to the require-
ments of society at the time of its application in court. "50 Most 
relevant to interspousal tort immunity, however, was the court's 
recent refusal to defer to the Legislature when resolving the par-
ent-child immunity question. The court's task was "made easier 
than other states," because this was a "case of first impression" 
unencumbered by precedent and there was little legislation in the 
field. 111 But, the court still (1) determined "which rule best serves 
the needs of justice in this state," (2) characterized parent-child 
47. Leary, 168 Mont. at 486, 544 P.2d at 447. 
48. For comprehensive lists of courts that have not deferred, see Digby, 120 R.I. at 
302, 388 A.2d at 2; Annot., 92 A.L.R.3n 901 (1979). 
49. See, e.g., Fernandez, 132 Ariz. at 449, 646 P.2d at 880; Brooks, 259 Ind. at 23, 284 
N.E.2d at 797; Ebert v. Ebert, 232 Kan. 502, 503, 656 P.2d 766, 767 (1983); Shearer, 18 Ohio 
St. 3d at_, 480 N.E.2d at 394; Davis v. Davis, 657 S.W.2d 753, 758 (Tenn. 1983). The 
election of judges in certain jurisdictions, including Montana, see, e.g., MONT. ConE ANN. § 
3-2-101 (1985); N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 2; weakens the authority argument in the sense that 
judges too are the "elected representatives" of the people. 
50. See Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 162 Mont. 506, 515, 513 
P.2d 268, 273-74 (1973) (citing State v. Culver, 23 N.J. 495, 505, 129 A.2d 715, 721, cert. 
denied, 354 U.S. 925 (1957)). For recent examples of the court's increasing willingness to 
freely modify common law tort doctrines, see Versland v. Caron Transport, _ Mont. 
_, 671 P.2d 583 (1983); cases developing tort of bad faith, reviewed in Hopkins and 
Robinson, Employment At-Will, Wrongful Discharge, and the Covenant of Good Faith and 
Fair Dealing in Montana, Past, Present, and Future, 46 MONT. L. REv. 1, 6-14 (1985). 
51. See Royle,_ Mont. at_, 656 P.2d at 824. 
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immunity as a "man-made rule," and (3) described the judiciary's 
duty in "examining it to make such rule as justice requires when 
the legislature has not chosen to act," by according children the 
"same right or protection and the same legal redress for wrongs 
done them as others. "62 
These considerations apply with substantial force to inter-
spousal tort immunity, although there are certain dissimilarities in 
the two intrafamily immunities. 63 Interspousal immunity is no less 
"man-made" than parent-child immunity. Spouses, especially 
wives, are no less entitled to rights, protection and redress than 
children. Interspousal immunity perpetrates additional injustices. 
It disproportionately affects women, as the four Montana cases il-
lustrate, because husbands invariably drive the family car and 
cause a significant percentage of household accidents. 64 Immunity's 
retention also disappoints the reasonable expectations of responsi-
ble vehicle owners who purchase insurance in part to protect fam-
ily members against negligently inflicted injury.66 Moreover, immu-
nity's continued application could actually disrupt marital 
harmony by imposing substantial financial burdens for which com-
pensation cannot be recovered. 68 
Specific activity of the Montana Legislature in the inter-
spousal immunity area does not seem particularly significant. Leg-
islative silence or inaction has never been considered very impor-
tant by the judiciary. 67 Where a legislature has chosen to address 
52. Id. 
53. Parent-child immunity originated more recently, but so did its abolition, and chil-
dren may have been even more constrained than wives at common law. Cf. sources cited in 
id. at 823; Hollister, Parent-Child Immunity: A Doctrine in Search of Justification, 50 
FORDHAM L. REV. 489 (1982) (histories of parent-child immunity and children's rights). It 
also is arguable that the married women's acts constitute legislative activity in the area of 
interspousal immunity, while little comparable legislation exists as to children. But cf. 
MoNT. CONST. art. II, § 15 (1972) (rights of persons not adults). For additional comparison of 
the intrafamily immunities, see Ashdown, supra note 36. 
54. Approximately 90% of the plaintiffs in cases challenging immunity from suit for 
negligent driving have been wives. Cf. Annot., 92 A.L.R.3D 901 (1979) (compilation of cases); 
the four Montana cases (wives were plaintiffs). As to household accidents, the most recent 
area for abolition of negligence immunity, see Merenoff, 76 N.J. 353, 388 A.2d 951; RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895 F (1979). 
55. See Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 495, 267 A.2d 481, 485 (1970). Indeed, some 
courts mention the irony inherent in the insured being unable to protect the "persons near-
est to him whom he would most like to see compensated for their injuries." Shearer, 18 Ohio 
St. 3d at __ , 480 N.E.2d at 395. Accord Beaudette, 285 Minn. at 371, 173 N.W.2d at 419. 
56. See Immer, 56 N.J. at 495, 267 A.2d at 485; Shearer, 18 Ohio St. 3d at __ , 480 
N.E.2d at 393. See generally Cutright, Income and Family Events: Marital Stability, 33 J. 
MAR. & FAM. 291 (1971). 
57. See, e.g., Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119, 121 (1940); United States v. 
Southern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 560-61 (1944); N.L.R.B. v. Plasterers Local 
Union, 404 U.S. 116, 130-31 (1971). 
34 MONTANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47 
one aspect of a larger problem or to speak in a closely related area, 
courts generally have not treated such activity as a rejection of 
propositions not explicitly provided for or binding on the judici-
ary.118 Indeed, when legislative bodies have expressly addressed, or 
even specifically rejected, a proposition before the court, judges 
have accorded little significance to that activity, much less consid-
ered themselves bound, in areas peculiarly non-statutory and ap-
propriate for case law-common law development.119 
Furthermore, the judiciary is competent to address the immu-
nity issue and should not defer to the legislature. Abolition of in-
terspousal tort immunity is not complicated and requires little 
data to be resolved. Courts are actually more qualified than legisla-
tors to treat the few significant policy questions raised: judges have 
greater familiarity with fraudulent and collusive litigation, while 
cases involving conjugal harmony are a staple of their existence.60 
Indeed, the Montana court quite competently addressed one of the 
minuscule number of complex issues implicated by intrafamily im-
munities when it invalidated family exclusion clauses in Tran-
samerica Insurance Co. v. Royle.61 Finally, of course, should the 
legislature disagree with judicial resolution of interspousal immu-
nity, that determination can always be altered. 
58. Indeed, abolition of negligence immunity seems marginally relevant to the 1979 
legislation the principal focus of which was spouse abuse. See generally supra note 31 and 
accompanying text; infra note 59. 
59. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. One inference which could be drawn 
from the 1979 legislative activity is that a legislature willing to abolish the interspousal im-
munity that involves behavior more morally reprehensible, and threatening to marital har-
mony, like wife battering, would consider appropriate judicial abrogation of the immunity 
generally lacking any element of moral reprehensibility, such as negligent driving. See gen-
erally infra note 73 and accompanying text. But cf. Towe interview, supra note 31 (Legisla-
ture would never have abolished negligence immunity). Moreover, the 1979 Legislature may 
have not abolished negligence immunity because it had limited relevance to a legislative 
package aimed principally at spousal abuse or for any number of other reasons relating to 
the legislative process, such as time constraints or priority accorded other propositions. A 
classic example of judicial reluctance to draw inferences from similar legislative machina-
tions is National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 693-97 (D.C. Cir. 1973), 
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974). 
60. As to being a staple of existence, see Harris v. Harris, 252 Ga. 387, 389, 313 S.E.2d 
88, 90 (1984) (Weltner, J., dissenting). See generally supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
Judges also have greater familiarity with frivolous and trivial suits and the redress provided 
by alternative relief. See generally supra notes 17, 32 and accompanying text. 
61. See Royle, __ Mont. __ , 656 P.2d 820. See generally supra note 42 and ac-
companying text. The Legislature also could act in fields, like family law, where abolition 
might have effects that judges cannot treat adequately. See generally supra note 46. 
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B. Reasons for Abolition of Immunity 
1. Tort Law Purposes 
Abolition of interspousal negligence immunity would permit 
realization of numerous tort law goals.62 Most important is afford-
ing wedded people injured by their spouses' unreasonable behavior 
the opportunity to seek compensation.63 The Montana Supreme 
Court seemed to recognize this purpose in the parent-child context 
when it observed that children should enjoy the "same legal re-
dress for wrongs done them as others enjoy."6" Moreover, spouses, 
particularly married females, are equally deserving. Many judges 
who articulate this policy rely upon state constitutional provisions 
like Article II, section 16, of the Montana Constitution: "Courts of 
justice shall be open to every person and speedy remedy afforded 
for every injury of person, property, or character."65 The compen-
sation rationale, however, is based principally on the "prevalence 
of automobile liability insurance,'' as the Montana Supreme Court 
explicitly observed in Royle.66 
All of the policy arguments enunciated for immunity's reten-
tion are somehow responsive to the compensation notion. For in-
stance, the alternative remedies provided by divorce and criminal 
law are said to be adequate, while allowing interspousal tort litiga-
tion can threaten connubial harmony or "open the fioodgates."67 
But the most serious contention is that husbands and wives will 
engage in fraud and collusion, thereby eroding the integrity of the 
civil justice system. 68 
2. Individual Rights 
Courts have not specifically or thoroughly enunciated the con-
62. For example, abolition would allow every person, notwithstanding marital status, 
to be held responsible for unreasonable behavior. But abrogation would have minimal deter-
rent effect and rarely punish. See generally PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 2, at §§ 2-4. 
63. See, e.g., Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass. 619, 626, 351 N.E.2d 526, 532 (1976); 
Beaudette, 285 Minn. at 373, 173 N.W.2d at 419; Rupert, 90 Nev. at 402, 528 P.2d at 1016. 
For a thorough treatment of the compensation rationale, see Ashdown, supra note 36. See 
generally James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 
YALE L.J. 549 (1948). 
64. Royle, _ Mont. at _, 656 P.2d at 824. 
65. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 16 (1972). See generally infra note 70. But see Conley, 92 
Mont. at 439, 15 P.2d at 926. (rejection of argument for abolition premised on provision's 
predecessor). 
66. Royle, _ Mont. at_, 656 P.2d at 823. Accord Surratt's Adm'r v. Thompson, 
212 Va. 191, 194, 183 S.E.2d 200, 202 (1971); Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer, 161 W. Va. 557, 
566, 244 S.E.2d 338, 343 (1978); Ashdown, supra note 36. 
67. See generally supra notes 17, 32-33 and accompanying text. 
68. See supra section Il(A)(l) and infra section III(A) of this article. 
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cept of providing females rights.69 Some judges have premised abo-
lition on constitutional commands similar to the Montana provi-
sion mentioned above,70 while a few have relied upon the idea of 
equal protection.71 Numerous modern opinions also include allu-
sions, like that in Royle, to rights of family members and disquali-
fication of a whole class of people essentially on the basis of that 
status.72 One reason for the cursory treatment accorded this con-
cept is that personal dignity and individual rights are implicated 
much less by negligent, than intentional, interspousal behavior.73 
Nonetheless, immunity from suit in negligence has disproportion-
ate impact on women, relegating them to "second-class citizen-
ship,'' and should be abrogated if only to eliminate one vestige of 
such citizenship. 
There has been little direct response to this notion; it has not 
been articulated often, expressly or comprehensively. Had courts 
responded, most would have premised their answers on the idea 
that affording wives rights against their husbands could disrupt 
conjugal harmony.74 More specifically, as to equal protection, nu-
merous judges might have agreed with the Conley court that inter-
spousal tort immunity provided "absolute equality" in that neither 
spouse "had a cause of action against the other."75 
Ill. IMPLICATIONS OF ABOLITION 
The examination above suggests that interspousal negligence 
immunity ought to be abolished, and it is likely to be substantially 
undermined, if not destroyed, in the ensuing decade. It is worth-
while, however, to consider abrogation's consequences for tort ju-
69. For early examples, see Austin, 136 Miss. at 70, 100 So. at 593 (Etheridge, J., 
dissenting); Crowell, 180 N.C. at 522, 105 S.E. at 210. For more recent ones, see Fernandez, 
132 Ariz. at 449-50, 646 P.2d at 880-81; Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d at 186-189, 500 P.2d at 773-74. 
Cf. Olsen, supra note 17, at 1509-13, 1530-39 (discussion of individual rights idea). 
70. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. Typical cases are Brooks, 259 Ind. at 
24, 284 N.E.2d at 798; Imig v. March, 203 Neb. 537, 545, 279 N.W.2d 382, 386 (1979); Rich-
ard v. Richard, 131 Vt. 98, 106, 300 A.2d 637, 641 (1973). 
71. The most recent is Moran v. Beyer, 734 F.2d 1254 (7th Cir. 1984). Cf. MoNT. 
CONST. art. II, § 4 (equal protection and sex discrimination provisions); supra note 54 and 
accompanying text (disproportionate impact of immunity on women). But see infra note 75 
and accompanying text. 
72. See Royle, __ Mont. at_, 656 P.2d at 824. Accord Hack, 495 Pa. at 300, 303, 
433 A.2d at 860; MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 A.2d 71, 75 (Me. 1980); Merenoff, 76 N.J. at 
566-67, 388 A.2d at 962; supra note 38 and accompanying text. Cf. Olsen, supra note 17, at 
1530-39 (discussion of family members' rights). 
73. See generally supra note 59 (comparing negligent driving with wife battering). 
7 4. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
75. Conley, 92 Mont. at 436, 15 P.2d at 925 (citing Austin, 136 Miss. at 61, 100 So. at 
592). See generally supra note 17. But see supra notes 54, 72 and accompanying text. 
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risprudence and for society. 
A. Tort Law Implications 
The effect of abolition on the tort law system will be minimal. 
Yet, numerous husbands and wives will be able to secure compen-
satory relief and some deterrence may result. There will, of course, 
be disadvantages. More claims will be pursued, thereby addition-
ally burdening an already overworked state judiciary. Most diffi-
cult, however, will be the problem of interspousal fraud and collu-
sion which "cannot be lightly dismissed,'' so that a "minimum 
challenge to judicial resourcefulness will be to act promptly and 
firmly at any appearance of' such behavior.76 Thus, some compli-
cations may impugn the integrity of, and public trust in, the tort 
law process, although most can be treated. 
B. Societal Implications 
Abolition will have beneficial impacts for women, wedlock, 
wives, and the family. Abrogation may increase the respect ac-
corded married individuals in numerous ways. Most importantly, it 
affords wedded females one constituent of the full panoply of 
rights enjoyed by other members of society. Women are especially 
likely to benefit because they are disproportionately injured by 
negligent interspousal behavior77 and have historically been per-
ceived as weak beings entitled to fewer rights than men. 78 But abo-
lition also has detrimental implications and restrictions. For in-
stance, it does little to democratize family life or to enhance 
interspousal relationships. 79 
The advantages of negligence immunity's elimination are 
greater than its disadvantages. Thus, abolition is proper. The Mon-
tana Supreme Court should abrogate the rule when it confronts 
the immunity question in 1986. If the court finds appropriate con-
tinued deference or application of the doctrine, the Legislature 
should eliminate immunity in its next session. 
76. The first quotation appears in Ashdown, supra note 36, at 251. The second is in 
Beaudette, 285 Minn. at 372, 173 N.W.2d at 420. See generally supra section Il(A)(l) of 
this article. 
77. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
78. See, e.g., Bradwell, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring); Muller v. 
Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). See generally Olsen, supra note 17; Powers, Sex Segregation 
and the Ambivalent Directions of Sex Discrimination Law, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 55. 
79. See Olsen, supra note 17, at 1537-38, 1559-60. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Interspousal tort immunity for negligence has enjoyed a short, 
largely unexamined, tenure in Montana. But its current applica-
tion cannot be justified and serves principally to bar potentially 
legitimate claims of husbands and wives on the basis of marital 
status. Therefore, the court or the Legislature should abolish the 
rule at its earliest opportunity. 
